Mr. President, I thank the Senator from Arizona for

yielding, as well as for his leadership on this issue. He has provided

strong and forceful leadership in support of the war on terrorism. It

is vitally important that all of us, not just as Members of the Senate,

but as Americans, support this administration and support our troops in

making sure we win this war on terrorism.

I would like to start by saying I have spent the last 3 years working

on intelligence issues, first in the House and now in the Senate

Intelligence Committees, and have learned some things that are very

relevant to this discussion.

First, many across the aisle supported massive cuts to the

intelligence community budget throughout the 1990s. Between 1992 and

1998, in fact, the Central Intelligence Agency closed one-third of its

overseas field stations, lost one-quarter of its clandestine service

case officers, lost 40 percent of its recruited spies, and CIA

intelligence reports declined by nearly one-half.

The Clinton administration, supported by many Democrats in this

Chamber today, decided from the outset that the end of the cold war

meant we no longer needed intelligence on national security threats.

The end of the cold war divide in actual fact made the world a much

more complex place, with a host of new, unconventional, and asymmetric

threats to our security we were not well prepared to address. Instead

of dismantling our intelligence apparatus in the 1990s, recent history

has proved beyond a shadow of doubt we should have been expanding and

enhancing the quality of those capabilities so we could better

understand and

counter the new nature of the threat. The record will show many on our

side of the aisle were making this very point throughout the 1990s.

It is absurd to argue, as some in the other party appear to have

suggested over the years, that by emasculating the CIA and our other

intelligence agencies, our Nation's security would not be affected, or

even would be enhanced.

I would just add that penetrating terrorist groups and rogue states,

so-called hard targets, is a difficult and dangerous business. It

requires a robust overseas intelligence presence, adequate and

sustained resources, a wide-ranging stable of recruited and vetted

spies, strong bipartisan support from Congress and the White House, and

a willingness to take calculated risks. I submit the facts of the 1990s

strongly suggest we had none of these.

In addition, it is apparent to me the intelligence community during

the 1990s was skewed far too heavily in favor of technical collection

of intelligence over what is the cornerstone of the business: human

intelligence gathering or HUMINT, i.e., using spies to acquire

information on the plans and intentions of our adversaries.

When my House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland

Security took a hard look at the erosion of our intelligence

capabilities in the 1990s, right after 9/11, it became clear to me our

human spies were almost considered to be obsolete by the Clinton

administration and its appointed intelligence community leadership.

When David Kay spoke about his experiences searching for WMD in Iraq

on the ``Jim Lehrer News Hour'' last month, he said:

I fully agree with Dr. Kay, and would just note it takes a long time

and a great deal of effort to build such human espionage capabilities.

Yet our colleagues across the aisle proved in the 1990s that such

capabilities, however imperfect, could be torn down quickly and with

ease.

In July of 1997, Congresswoman Maxine Waters, over in the House,

said:

I cite the Congressional Record, dated July 9, 1997. In that same

debate, then-Congressman David Bonior commented:

I cite again the Congressional Record, dated July 9, 1997. That same

year, here in the Senate, the junior Senator from Massachusetts

questioned: ``Why is it that our vast intelligence apparatus continues

to grow . . .'' now that the cold war struggle is over?

I cite the Congressional Record, dated May 1, 1997. Two years before

that, the same Senator proposed we cut the intelligence budget by $1.5

billion, not for specific programs but across the board. In 1994, that

same Senator wanted to cut the intelligence budget by $1 billion and to

freeze intelligence spending. That is the record.

Now, it is going to be awfully hard for certain individuals in the

other party to justify their actions on national security matters

during the near decade-long period of neglect and erosion of our

intelligence capabilities of which they were directly complicit. It is

stunning--although not surprising--that such individuals are now

seeking to rewrite their own history.

I add that the junior Senator from Massachusetts in 1995 proposed to

cut $1.5 billion from the intelligence community. That bill he

introduced would have exacted cuts of $300 million in each of the

fiscal years 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, and again in the year 2000. The

proposal was so out of line with reality that there were no cosponsors

on the bill and, thank goodness, it never made it to the floor.

I ask the question, Why is it that an atmosphere of extreme risk

aversion pervaded the intelligence community during the 1990s and lasts

even to the present day in some respects?

There are two particular events that bother me. First, when I chaired

the House Intelligence Subcommittee on Terrorism and Homeland Security

in 2001 and 2002, I was particularly struck by the internal CIA

guidelines promulgated in 1995 by then-Director of CIA, John Deutch,

that severely limited the ability of CIA case officers to meet with,

develop, and recruit foreign nationals who may have been involved in

dubious activities or have blood on their hands.

We found, through extensive oversight work and dialog with CIA field

officers, that these so-called Deutch guidelines had a significant

chilling effect on our ability to operate against terrorist and rogue

state ``hard targets.'' After all, how can one penetrate a terrorist

organization or Saddam's brutal regime, for that matter, without

dealing with unsavory people?

The guidelines were, in my view, a primary cause of the risk aversion

to which I refer in my question, and they actually stayed in effect

through July of 2002, when we finally succeeded after many efforts to

compel the DCI to repeal them.

The second event concerns Mr. Deutch's decision during his mercifully

short tenure as DCI to conduct a CIA-wide ``asset scrub,'' which

applied an inflexible reporting standard to all CIA spies that, if not

met, resulted in their automatic firing.

The fact is, the spying business is a lot different than a simple

calculation of profit and loss. Spies are human beings who put their

lives on the line to spy for us. We have a special responsibility to

them and their families. Just because a spy's access may have dried up

for a time, that doesn't mean they won't prove useful later on on other

issues. Moreover, since we have had many gaps in our clandestine

coverage of key issues at the time of the scrub, termination of spies

was done without regard to how we might otherwise cover a subject by

other means. Thus, our gaps were further exacerbated.

In my opinion, the Deutch guidelines and Deutch asset scrub are two

of the major driving forces behind the risk aversion to which I

referred in my question.

Mr. President, that is a direct byproduct of those years of neglect

and resource starvation during the previous administration.

I want to first make it clear that it has been my experience that the

stifling problem of risk aversion went from Washington to the field,

and not vice versa. I know that the young, often idealistic, aggressive

CIA case officers out on the front lines are not the problem.

Risk aversion starts when elected officials, on whose support CIA

depends in the face of failure as well as success, abandons the

discipline. The ``end of the cold war'' and ``peace dividend'' type

arguments of those in the other party during the 1990s clearly

manifested themselves in the form of political abandonment of our

intelligence community.

During those years of Democratic control of Congress, Hill support

for the intelligence mission was also questionable. I refer back to my

previous remarks about what the junior Senator from Massachusetts and

others tried to do to further reduce the intelligence community during

the 1990s as a case in point.

Moreover, the record will clearly show that during the periods of

Republican control of the House and Senate, significant efforts were

made to increase the top line of President Clinton's annual

intelligence budget requests. Some of these Republican efforts were

successful; others were not. But for the most part, we brought the

previous administration along kicking and screaming.

It should not be surprising that when the politicians turn their back

on the intelligence community, politically appointed intelligence

seniors start to become more reluctant to approve operations that might

result in some sort of political flap because they know they won't be

supported.

When such intelligence seniors start to become overly conservative,

the managers below them follow suit. After a while, bureaucratic

obstacles, and other hoops through which field officers must jump

before getting operations approved, start to appear. That is where you

get the Deutch guidelines and the Deutch asset scrub.

Now we have to figure out how to undo the bureaucratic risk averse

mindset that has taken a decade to spread across the intelligence

community like a cancer and, like a cancer, radical treatment with

often painful side effects may very well be required.

That is what happens when national security becomes relegated to the

bottom of our Nation's priorities. Fortunately, we have a President now

who is anything but risk averse and who puts the long-term security

interests and safety of all Americans at the top of his list of

priorities.

On the issue of terrorism and homeland security, Americans deserve

strong leadership, not political games. Our President is providing the

positive leadership that will ensure the safety of our citizens.

I yield back to the Senator from Arizona.